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The purpose of this MBA Project is to investigate and provide a comprehensive overview 
of the utilization of contractors on the battlefield while specifically focusing on the effectiveness 
and efficiency of oversight provided on Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) 
contracts in Iraq.  The study begins by providing a historical road map of contractors on the 
battlefield leading up to the introduction of LOGCAP, which has provided the US Army and 
other government organizations logistical support services for over two decades.  The study 
continues with an overview of the LOGCAP program; the utilization of LOGCAP; a historical 
perspective on GAO reporting on oversight issues associated with LOGCAP contracts; and an 
analysis of the efficiency and effectiveness of oversight of LOGCAP contracts in Iraq.  Evidence 
reveals that LOGCAP’s management and oversight challenges continue to exist in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. The empirical data presented shows a correlation between the lack of centralized 
authority of control and deficient civilian supervision of the contractors.  Review and analysis of 
empirical data was conducted using General Accounting Office (GAO) audit reports.  These 
reports provided the primary basis for this study along with interviews and literature research.  
Analysis is applied to the data gathered to develop recommendations to optimize the use of 
effective and efficient logistic civilian support in a combat environment.  Upon completion of the 
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Contractors are not limited to military acquisition and logistic support functions.  
Today, they perform work on virtually every military installation and their presence on 
the battlefield is a reality as they accompany the military into war zones and into battle.  
Research reveals that the number of contractors on the battlefield has increased with each 
war or contingency operation.  “During Operation Desert Storm, there was [one] 
contractor for every 100 military personnel.”1  While in Bosnia, the ratio of contractors 
versus military personnel was nearly [one] to [one] at times.2   Even in Iraqi Freedom, the 
Army employed civilian contractors by using a Logistic Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP) contract that also provided a wide variety of support.3  This steady increase 
in number of contractors has become a key component of activity management in both 
the private and public sectors.4  In addition, management and oversight concerns 
associated with the increase have been under the scrutiny of the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) for some years now.  Recently, internal auditors investigated the Army’s 
LOGCAP contracts and recommended a higher level of oversight5 and coordination.  The 
Defense Department agreed with the recommendation.6  Although the investigation 
revealed evidence that there was a lack of oversight, could a higher level of oversight 
prove to be a viable solution or just an immediate response to a problem that is receiving 
high visibility?  Our research explores the oversight of LOGCAP from past to present and 
provides a historical background leading up to its implementation.   
                                                 
1 Robinson, Linda and Pasteanak, Douglas.  America’s Secret Armies: a Swarm of Private Contractors 
Bedevils the US Military.  US News and World Report.  Nov 4, 02, Vol. 133, Iss. 17, Pg. 38.  
2 Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4 Gary Storrs, Labor Economist, American Federation Of State, County & Municipal Employees 
(Afscme), Afl-Cio Summary Of June 11, 2001 Public Hearing  Commercial Activities Panel Public 
Hearing, Washington, D.C. June 11, 2001 Hearing Summary 
Http://Www.Gao.Gov/A76panel/Summary010611.Html 
5 http://www.pogo.org/p/contracts/co-040301-iraq.html.  For the purpose of this paper, oversight 
means documentation of proper performance throughout the life of a contract.  It includes oversight 
measures performed to protect government interests, ensure the government gets what it pays for, and 
identify deficiencies that may delay performance. 
6Griff Witte.  Contractors were poorly monitored, GAO says.  Washington Post.  May 02, 2005. 
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First, research for this review includes a collection of data that builds upon the 
information using the applied research method.  This method provides a possible solution 
to the above question.  In “Contractors in Contingency Operations: Panacea or Pain?”  
Manker and Williams investigated the possible consequences and issues surrounding 
contractors on the battlefield.  The authors provided a sound background on the history of 
contractors on the battlefield.   
Secondly, although this history is common in most articles reviewed, their unique 
usage of the background information provided an excellent and an appropriate foundation 
to begin our research.  Our research includes a collection of data that utilizes their 
investigations.  This collection of data afforded us a framework to conclude with a list of 
possible courses of actions to explore or address in future studies.   
Finally, our research employed two methodologies: (1) weighted literature 
reviews from General Accountability Office (GAO) reports, polices and guidelines 
utilizing oversight, magazines articles; and websites; and (2) personal interviews with 
representatives from deployed locations. 
Although the primary focal point of our research was oversight of the LOGCAP 
program, other keys issues discovered included: (1) lack of guidance and contractor 
tracking mechanisms; (2) authority, roles, and rotation of personnel; (3) varied 
policies/guidance; (4) continued planning/oversight issues; (5) use of contractor 
purchasing system review (CPSR) as a means of oversight; (6) examination of 
Contractor’s Purchasing System; (7) Consent to Subcontract; (8) Contractor Purchasing 
System Review Considerations; (9) Use of CPSR in Iraq; (10) CPSR Effectiveness in 
Iraq; and (11) Stateside CPSR Audit Results. 
While this report covers many issues dealing with oversight of LOGCAP, many 
areas require further research.  Areas of interest for further research include processes and 
procedures of LOGCAP; training of deployed personnel; contractors’ purchasing systems 




A.  RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
The U.S. Army has traditionally employed civilian contractors in noncombatant 
roles to supplement military forces.  Initially, their primary roles or duties consisted of 
providing supplies and services to U.S. troops.  Since the early 1990s, much of this 
support has come from logistics support contracts—contracts that are awarded prior to 
the beginning of contingencies and are available to support the troops as needed.7  These 
contracts are currently utilized by the Services in more than half a dozen countries, and 
specifically, Iraq. 
Logistic Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) provides for the use of 
civilian contractors during wartime and unforeseen military emergencies to augment the 
U.S. Army combat support service capability.  Under the LOGCAP program, a civilian 
contractor provides a wide array of logistical and engineering services to deployed forces.  
The use of LOGCAP to support U.S. troops in Iraq is the largest effort in the history of 
the implementation of LOGCAP; both in number of troops supported and in land mass.8    
As stated above, LOGCAP is a large undertaking and requires personnel with the 
correct knowledge and expertise to manage and oversee the contractors.  The Defense 
Contracting Management Agency (DCMA) administrative contracting officers assist 
deployed contracting officers in providing such oversight. DCMA is an independent 
combat support agency within the Department of Defense (DoD) that serves as the 
Department’s contract manager, responsible for ensuring that federal acquisition 
programs, supplies, and services are delivered on time, within cost, and meet 
performance requirements. 
                                                 
7GAO, Military Operations: DOD’s Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts Requires 
Strengthened Oversight, GAO-04-854 (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2004). 
8Ibid. 
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The oversight of contracts ultimately rests with the contracting officer, who is 
responsible for ensuring that contractors meet the requirements set forth in the contract.  
However, most contracting officers are not located at deployed locations.  Although 
oversight of a contract is the contracting officer’s responsibility, the contracting officer 
may delegate oversight responsibilities to DCMA.  
DCMA normally uses contracting officers’ technical representatives (COTRs).  
Contracting officers’ technical representatives are individuals designated by their unit, 
appointed, and trained by the administrative contracting officer.  They provide technical 
oversight of the contractor’s performance, but they cannot direct the contractor by 
making commitments or changes that are contrary to existing terms and conditions 
specified in the contract.  
Challenges to effective and efficient oversight include recurring contractor 
problems such as poor cost reporting; difficulties with producing and meeting schedules; 
and inadequate controls over purchasing, which make the LOGCAP contract more 
difficult to administer.  Since 1997, GAO has reviewed, identified, and recommended 
management and oversight control measures for LOGCAP; nonetheless, there has been 
limited specific guidance established and implemented.9  Research shows that both 
Congress and DoD have acted on the GAO report findings but implementation of new 
guidance is still a work in progress.  
 
B.  RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this report is to examine and explore the means by which 
Logistic Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) can effectively operate in a 
contingency environment and provide support to warfighters effectively.  LOGCAP 
contracts have provided a wide variety of services and commodities in support of U.S. 
forces in times of war and contingency operations.  Recently, internal auditors 
                                                 
9 GAO, Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program, GAO/NSIAD-97-63 (Washington, D.C.: February 11, 1997). 
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investigated the Army’s LOGCAP contracts and recommended the need for a higher 
level of oversight and coordination.  This research addresses the auditor’s investigation 
along with the utilization of LOGCAP.  It also covers Army regulations, A-76 guidance 
and policy, GAO responses and investigations, Government Directives and Regulations, 
Contracting Purchasing System Review, policy, objectives, plans, experience and 
knowledge of the contracting infrastructure and other studies and analysis. 
The report is broken down into the following research areas: 1) an introduction to 
what LOGCAP is, a description and history of LOGCAP, and a snapshot of the evolution 
of LOGCAP’s history of contractors on the battlefield; 2) administrative challenges on 
the battlefield, oversight and problems of LOGCAP; 3) a discussion of management and 
oversight of LOGCAP specifically in Iraq; and  4) survey and interview results compared 
to GAO reports, conclusion and recommendations to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of future LOGCAP missions. 
 
C. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The primary research question is: Outsourcing the War in Iraq: was oversight of 
the Army’s Logistic Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) effectively and 
efficiently conducted?  The secondary research questions are: 
1. What was the policy and objective regarding oversight of contractors on the 
battlefield? 
2. What were the planned processes for contractor oversight/contractor  usage? 
3. Were there deviations from the plan or policy? 
4. Is there a lack of oversight with LOGCAP? 
5. Is there a problem with tracking the number of contractors on the battlefield? 
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6. Does the military have enough people, whether military members or civilian 
employees, to conduct oversight? 
7.  How are contractors on the battlefield (LOGCAP) addressed in the War Plan 
8. What are the experience levels of the Administrative Contracting Officers 
(ACO) in the area of performance and how often do they rotate from the war 
zone? 
9. Is the field manual for using contractors on the battlefield and its primary 
regulation for obtaining contractor support in wartime operations available 
now? 
 
D. SCOPE OF PROJECT 
This research: 
1. Explores the history of contractors on the battlefield through literary 
reviews; and, 
2. Assesses factors that may influence the lack of oversight on contracts and 
try to validate whether these factors existed on the battlefield. 
• What were the policy and objectives regarding contractors on the 
battlefield? 
• What were the planned processes for contractor oversight/contractor 
usage? 
• Were there deviations from the plans and/or policies? 
• What are possible causes for the deviations, where, when, and to what 
extent? 
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3. Describe typical methods of administration and surveillance in a normal 
situation. 
4. Describe methods of administration and surveillance of contracts using the 
Contractor Purchasing System Review (CPSR) as a means of oversight. 
5. Gather feedback from interviews with LOGCAP’s PCOs, ACOs, and 
CORs. 
6. Devise lessons and recommendations for improvement utilizing 
LOGCAP. 
E.  METHODOLOGY/ LITERATURE REVIEW 
The methodology used in this report includes a literature review of GAO reports 
about LOGCAP’s contracting polices and guidelines, websites, periodical reviews and 
magazines.  The researchers also conducted personal interviews with representatives 
from DCMA Headquarters.  The methodology followed for this thesis consists of the 
following: 
1. Research contractors functions on the battlefield, normal contract 
administration and surveillance processes through documentation. 
2. Research the situation:   
a. What were the existing policies and objectives regarding oversight 
of contractors on the battlefield in Iraq? 
b. What was the plan? 
c. What were the planned processes?  
d. Deviations from the plan and/or policy: 
e. Possible causes:  What, where, when and to what extent 
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3. Research the verification, validation and accreditation process of the 
administration and surveillance processes. 
4. Describe typical contract administration and surveillance procedures. 
5. Determine whether these functions are performed the same on the 
battlefield. 
6. Describe factors that present a challenge to conducting normal contract 
administration and surveillance. 
7. Conduct a comparative analysis of interview feedback and data gathered 
from documentation. 
8. Induce lessons from the findings 
9. Conduct a search of acquisition related web sites. 
Research literature available in the form of GAO reports, books, journal articles, 
and other library information sources. 
 
F.  ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The results of the research are presented in five chapters.  The first chapter 
discusses the background and provides a framework for this research.  Chapter II presents 
the history of contractors on the battlefield, how LOGCAP was formed and the utilization 
of LOGCAP.  Chapter III discusses the oversight problems of LOGCAP. Chapter IV 
provides an analysis of the policy, procedures, and plans of oversight and insight of 
LOGCAP while paying special attention in Iraq based upon the information obtained 
through GAO reports; and Chapter V provides specific questions and answers conducted 





G.  BENEFIT OF RESEARCH 
This study provides valuable lessons learned on providing contract management 
and oversight on the battlefield.  It has the potential to bring to light some impediments 
and transparencies that may influence the effectiveness and efficiency of oversight 
procedures and mechanisms. 
 
H. DEFINITIONS 
Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) -- the FAR delineates specific 
functions to be performed only by the ACO.  |The ACO assumes responsibility for 
administering the day-to-day contractual activities after an award has been made.  
CIRCULAR NO. A-76—The Office of Federal Procurement states the purpose of 
Circular-No. A-76 is to establish Federal policy regarding the performance of commercial 
activities and implements the statutory requirements of the Federal Activities Inventory 
Reform Act of 1998, Public Law 105-270. The Supplement to this Circular set forth the 
procedures for determining whether commercial activities should be performed under 
contract with commercial sources or in-house using Government facilities and personnel. 
Contract – The FAR 2.101 defines a contract as a mutually binding legal 
relationship obligating the seller to furnish the supplies or services (including 
construction) and the buyer to pay for them. It includes all types of commitments that 
obligate the U.S. Government to an expenditure of appropriated funds and that, except as 
otherwise authorized, are in writing.  
Contract Administration.—The Office Federal Procurement Policy defines 
contract administration as those inherently governmental activities performed by 
warranted contracting officers (CO), the contracting officer's technical representatives 
(COTR), and related payment evaluation staff. Contract administration is not to be 
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confused with contract quality control, performance evaluation or inspection, which are 
defined as commercial activities by this Supplement and OFPP Policy Letter 92-1. 
Contracting – FAR part 2.101 defines contracting as purchasing, renting, leasing, 
or otherwise obtaining supplies or services from nonfederal sources. 
Contracting Officer (CO) – FAR part 2.101 defines a CO as a person with the 
authority to enter into, administer, and/or terminate contracts and make related 
determinations and findings. 
Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs)--are representatives of the 
Contracting Officer who assist with the technical monitoring and administration of a 
contract. The information submitted to the Contracting Officer by the requiring 
organization when recommending an individual for appointment as a COR must include 
all required qualifications and verification that required training has been met. 
Inherently Governmental Functions—The Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
definition is functions that is that are so intimately related to the public interest as to 
mandate performance by Government employees.  These functions include those 
activities that require either the exercise of discretion in applying Government authority 
or the making of value judgements in making decisions for the Government. 
Governmental functions normally fall into two categories: (1) the act of governing, i.e., 
the discretionary exercise of Government authority; and (2) monetary transactions and 
entitlement.  
Inherently Governmental Activity.—The Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
defines an inherently governmental activity as one that is so intimately related to the 
public interest as to mandate performance by Federal employees. Activities that meet 
these criteria are not in competition with commercial sources, are not generally available 
from commercial sources, and are, therefore, not subject to Circular A-76 or this 
Supplement. Guidance to avoid an unacceptable transfer of official responsibility to 
contract performance may be found in the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) 
Policy Letter 92-1. 
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Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) –The FAR part 2.101 defines a PCO as a 
person responsible for all contractual activities from receipt of the initial procurement 
package, preparing and issuing the Request for Proposal (RFP), participating in the 
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II. WHAT IS LOGCAP?  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) has provided the US 
Army and other government organizations support services for over two decades.  
Military operations have required civilian contractor support as far back as the 
Revolutionary War and the number of civilian contractors on the battlefield has steadily 
increased over the years.  Today, the support is not just limited to civilian logistic support 
functions.  The support has evolved into a teaming of military operations with civilian 
contractors.  This civil augmentation program now provides a wide variety of services 
and support to our US soldiers in almost every type of military operations. 
In accordance with ARMY Regulation 700-137, Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program (LOGCAP) dated 16 December 1985; LOGCAP is “advanced acquisition 
planning which provides for the use of civilian contractors during wartime and 
unforeseen military emergencies to augment the U.S. Army combat support service 
capability.  The contractor support will be arranged through combined advance 
acquisition and operations planning for peacetime planning for the use of civilian 
contractors in wartime and other contingencies.” 
 
B. HISTORY OF LOGCAP 
LOGCAP was derived from the concept of contractors on the battlefield, which is 
nothing new to the DoD; civilian contractors on the battlefield have been acknowledged 
as far back as the 16th century.  Even before the institution of the United States Army in 
1775, American military leaders were accustomed to relying on civilian contractors to 
fulfill the needs of their troops on campaigns.10  In 1775, civilian contractors escorted 
American armies on the battlefield.  George Washington contracted civilians to deliver 
                                                 
10 Dr. Charles R. Shrader, “Contractors on the Battlefield” research report No. 99-5, A USA’s 
Institute of Land Warfare, 1995, 5.  
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supplies using sutlers.11  Sutlers were civilians who followed the armies and were 
officially appointed to supply soldiers with a long list of approved items and provisions.  
During the Civil War, both the Union and Confederate army regiments were allowed one 
sutler to provide support to the troops.12  In these camps, soldiers could purchase from 
vendors such items as food, newspapers, books, tobacco, razors, tin plates, cups, cutlery, 
and illegal alcohol.  For the most part, since World War II, civilian contractors have 
contributed to the support and aid of our armies on the battlefield and have come to be 
viewed as an indispensable part of the Army’s war fighting and peacekeeping 
capability.13 
 
The Evolution of LOGCAP 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Army has relied on contractors as far back as the 
Revolutionary War.  By 1783, private contractors were generally accepted as the primary 
system for providing the U.S. Army with food, forage, fuel, clothing, equipment, 
weapons, transport and additional labor.14  However, the Army was slowly weaned from 
this system of private contractors.  In the 1820s, Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun did 
much to end reliance on private contractors to feed the Army by centralizing subsistence 
procurement in the office of the Commissary General of Subsistence.15    
In 1846, the rapid recruitment and movement of U.S. forces into Mexico put 
severe strains on the Army’s procurement system.  It forced the Army to reconsider the 
role they wanted the contractors to play.  Between 15 August 1845 and the end of 1846, 
the Quartermaster Department (a department of officers whose duty is to provide 
                                                 
11Dr. Charles R. Shrader, Contractors on the Battlefield, research report No. 99-5, A USA’s Institute 
of Land Warfare, 1995, 5. 
12http://www.civilwarhome.com/terms.htm 
13Dr. Charles R. Shrader, Contractors on the Battlefield,  research report No. 99-5, A USA’s Institute 




quarters, provisions, storage, clothing, fuel, stationery, and transportation for a regiment 
or other body of troops, and superintend the supplies)16 alone placed over 400 contracts, 
most of these contracts were for transportation services.  In the postwar period of the 
Indian wars from 1865 to 1890, the Army found the use of private contractors to provide 
food, fuel, and transportation to the frontier outposts to be a satisfactory supplement to 
the Army’s own system of arsenals, clothing factories, and storehouses.17    
In World War II, the use of contractors on the battlefield continued to increase 
due to the heavy involvement of civilians in war-related projects.  Workers were hired 
individually or through contracts with private firms to provide the support services 
required by U.S. forces in all the theaters of war.  This practice remained in place up until 
the Korean War.  
At the conclusion of the Korean War, contractor support had accounted for a wide 
range of services and contractors had become an essential element of logistical support 
capabilities by the Vietnam era and the Gulf War.   For example, in the Gulf War, the 
GAO estimates, in addition to 5,000 U.S. Government civilians, 9,200 contractor 
employees were deployed in support of U.S. Forces.  These contractors provided 
construction, base operations, water and ground transportation, petroleum supply and 
maintenance and technical support for high-technology systems.18   
Therefore, the history of our country’s wars and contingencies reveals that our 
military has become increasingly dependent upon the civilian sector for support.  Today, 
logistical support but has moved even more towards jobs that would normally be 
considered as inherently governmental functions.  The Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 92-1 defines inherently governmental functions as a 
“function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by 
                                                 
16 http://dict.die.net/quartermaster%20general/, Retrieved on June 5, 2006. 
17 Dr. Charles R. Shrader, Contractors on the Battlefield, research report No. 99-5, A USA’s Institute 
of Land Warfare, 1995, 5. 
18 Gordon L Campbell,  Contractors on the Battlefield:  The Ethics of Paying Civilians to Enter 
Harm’s Way and Requiring Soldiers to Depend upon Them.  Joint Services Conference on Professional 
Ethics 200.  January 27-28, 2000. 
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government employees. These functions include those activities that require either the 
exercise of discretion in applying government authority or the making of value judgments 
in making decisions for the Government.”19  
Over the years, almost all the logistic support functions have transitioned from 
being performed by military personnel to being performed by civilians.  During 
Operation Desert Storm, the use of contractors on the battlefield escalated. There was one 
contractor for every 100 military personnel.20  While in Bosnia, at times, the ratio was 
nearly one to one.21  The need for more contractors on the battlefield may be attributed to 
declining budgets and reduction in military force structure.  The DoD has been forced to 
seek less expensive and more efficient processes and ways of doing business because of 
peace dividends accrued at the end of the Cold War.22  The requirement to achieve these 
ends can be seen as a response to external forces, such as changes in the world order and 
threats to the country.  These forces, along with downsizing and the development of more 
technological weaponry systems requiring skill-sets the military has yet to provide to its 
active-duty workforce, can be viewed as the driving forces for transforming the military 
work force to depend on civilian contractors.  Whatever the case may be, history reveals 
the number of contractors on the battlefield is steadily increasing and evolving with each 
war and/or contingency operation. 
 
C. DEFINING LOGCAP 
LOGCAP is a U.S. Army initiative for peacetime planning for the use of civilian 
contractors in wartime and other contingencies.  These contractors perform selected 
                                                 
19 Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 92-1, “Inherently Governmental 
Functions”, APPENDIX 5 September 23, 1992 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/a076sa5.html 
20 Linda Robinson, and Douglas Pasteanak.  America’s Secret Armies: A Swarm Of Private 
Contractors Bedevils The U.S. Military.  U.S. News And World Report.  Nov 4, 02, Vol. 133, Iss. 17, Pg. 
38. 
21 Ibid. 
22 James E Manker. and Kent D. Williams.  Contractors In Contingency Operations, Panacea Or 
Pain?  U.S. Air Force Logistic Management Agency, Fall 2004. 
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services to support U.S. forces in support of DoD missions.  Use of contractors in a 
theater of operations allows the release of military units to perform other missions or to 
fill contingency shortfalls.  This program provides the Army with additional means 
adequately supporting the current and programmed forces. 
Today, the need to condense military budgets and the transfer of various 
governmental functions to private business has made contractors on the battlefield a vital 
one for American political and military leaders.  Almost every general logistics support 
function has been outsourced during this century, support functions such as providing 
food, laundry, sanitation, shower service, security, recreation, translator service, terminal 
and base camp operations, water and power production, and medical service support.  
Inuse of these support functions, contractors require their integration in accordance with 
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-53, Combat Service Support:  
[Civilians] . . . will provide an ever-increasing number of capabilities in 
support of future Army operations battle command environment and into 
the CSS framework, as well as mission training for the civilians involved.  
 
1. Background 
As previously stated, the Army has used contractors to provide supplies and 
services during both peacetime and contingencies dating back to the Revolutionary War.  
Currently, the role of civilian contractors on the battlefield has been partially addressed 
by the Army in AR 700-137, LOGCAP.  Although LOGCAP may provide additional 
support in areas with formal Host Nation Support (HNS) agreements, where other 
contractors are involved, or where peacetime support contracts exist,23 it is primarily 
designed for use in areas where no bilateral or multilateral agreements exist.   
LOGCAP is funded by the Department of the Army (DA) and managed by the 
Army Materiel Command (AMC).  It is available during Continental United States 
(CONUS) mobilizations to assist the CONUS support base and help units get ready for 
                                                 
23 https://www6.osc.army.mil/LSU/background.htm, Retrieved on July 20,2005. 
 18
war.  Its objective is to preplan for the use of civilian contractors to perform selected 
services in wartime to supplement Army forces.  Employment of civilian contractors in a 
contingency environment/battlefield releases military units for other missions or 
unmanned positions. 
 
2. Utilization of LOGCAP 
The first utilization of the LOGCAP program was in 1985 when the Third United 
States Army (TUSA) requested that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 
contract out a management plan to construct and maintain two petroleum pipeline 
systems in Southwest Asia in support of contingency operations.24  According to GAO 
Report, GAO/NSIAD-97-63 Contingency Operations, the initial LOGCAP contractor 
was Brown and Root Services (BRS) Corporation of Houston, Texas.  The Army 
conducted a competitive selection for an umbrella support contract for military 
contingency operations under its Logistics Civil Augmentation Program.  This contract 
was competitively awarded to Brown and Root Services on August 3, 1992 as a cost-
plus-award-fee contract with a one-year base period and a four-year option.  (Later, the 
Army contracted with more than 100 firms to obtain needed goods and services in the 
Balkans.25)  This contract was one of the Army’s largest single contracts.  Provisions of 
the basic contract provided a broad range of logistics and engineering services support for 
U.S. forces throughout the Balkans Theater.  It included providing support for Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Macedonia, as well as other Balkan countries, and Hungary.  The kind of  
services detailed food preparation and service, laundry, logistics support such as local 
transportation, building large portions of the base camps in Kosovo, and performing other 
                                                 
24 https://www6.osc.army.mil/LSU/background.htm 
25 David M. Walker, Contracting for Iraq Reconstruction and for Global Logistics Support, GAO-04-
869T, June 15, 2004. 
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construction as directed by the Army.  Figure 1 illustrates the proportion of services the 
Army required and BRS provided.26 
 




LOGCAP contracts have been in place in at least thirteen counties since its 
commencement.  The countries include Kuwait, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, Uzbekistan, 
Afghanistan, Djibouti, Philippines, Republic of Georgia, Rwanda, Somalia, East Timor 
and Bosnia.  The logistics services provided included: force provider, setup & 
maintenance, base camp operations and maintenance, facilities management, theater 
transportation/distribution support, fuel distribution, prime power, water/ice production, 
                                                 
26 Steven H. Sternlieb, Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost in the Balkans, GAO Report, 
GAO/NSIAD-00-225, September 2000. 
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laundry & bath, airfield operations, supply operations, firefighting, security assistance, 
mortuary affairs and the list continues.27  LOGCAP contracts have taken over a wide 
variety of support services and functions; however, recently internal auditors investigated 
the Army’s LOGCAP contracts and recommended that a higher level of oversight and 
coordination was needed.  The DoD agreed with the recommendation.28   
Although the GAO investigation revealed evidence that there was a lack of 
oversight, does requiring a higher level of oversight provide a viable solution.  Billions of 
tax dollars are spent on the LOGCAP contracts that support the war efforts; for this 
reason, the lack of oversight has become a major concern of the public.  The spending 
and deficient oversight is increasing the public’s lack of trust and confidence in the 
Government’s ability to provide effective and efficient oversight.  A GAO audit report 
identified a few of the challenges that have arisen with the DoD’s increasing dependency 
on contractors on the battlefield.  Our research explores a few of these challenges.  
                                                 
27 https://www6.osc.army.mil/LSU/background.htm 
28 Witte Griff., Contractors Were Poorly Monitored, GAO says. Washington Post. May 2005. 
 21
III. CONTRACT OVERSIGHT 
A. WHY OVERSIGHT? 
Defense regulations require contract oversight, which is also called surveillance.  
It involves documentation of proper performance throughout the life of the contract, but 
does not detail oversight procedures.29  Oversight protects Government interests, ensures 
the Government gets what it pays for, and identifies deficiencies that may delay 
performance.   
Consequently, lack of oversight can lead to favoritism, waste, abuse, and even 
fraud.  "If surveillance is not conducted, not sufficient or not well documented, DoD is at 
risk of being unable to identify and correct poor contractor performance in a timely 
manner”.30  Another implication of improper surveillance is that the Pentagon may not 
receive the needed quality and quantity of goods or services specified in the contract.  
The GAO published in report GAO-05-274 that the Defense Department, the 
Government's largest buyer of contractor services, often fails to fully oversee contracts.  
The report attributed the shortcoming to lack of personnel and training, improper 
documentation, and the low priority assigned to oversight.  In some contracts that lacked 
proper oversight, GAO found that contract values increased more than threefold over 
their life span.  As reported by GAO, the lack of contract oversight is becoming a serious 
problem; “Inadequate oversight for U.S. forces logistics contracts in Kuwait and Iraq "is 
a serious problem," reported the chief of the U.S. General Accounting Office.31   
A recent GAO report suggested that interagency contracts were at greater risk for 
improper oversight.  Of forty-five interagency contracts studied in the report, twenty-five 
lacked proper scrutiny.  Additionally, earlier this year, GAO identified interagency 
contracting as a high-risk area.  For example, in a review of ninety contracts, valued over 





$385.7 million, GAO found that contract oversight was insufficient for twenty-six of 
these contracts and sufficient for only sixty-four contracts.32 
 
B. CHALLENGES TO OVERSIGHT 
In the article entitled, “Contractors were poorly monitored, GAO says”, Witte 
Griff identifies a few challenges that have arisen with the DoD’s increasing dependency 
on contractors on the battlefield.  The challenges include concerns surrounding the DoD’s 
authority to compel the contractor to continue to perform on the battlefield in the 
presence of danger and who is in charge of the contractors.  More specifically, does the 
Army have the personnel to effectively manage these contractors?  Based on the article, 
the answer is no.   
The Army awarded contracts to civilians to keep track of, and monitor, their own 
contracts.  The question arises as to whether this is an inherently governmental function.  
Civilian assistance today is not only for logistical support but also for jobs that could 
previously have been considered as inherently governmental.  OMB Circular A-76 
provides guidance that encourages agencies to obtain reliable internal cost and 
performance information before acquiring goods and services from the private sector, 
commonly referred to as competitive sourcing.  Directives to compete a percentage of the 
FAIR Act inventory create a perverse incentive to reclassify inherently governmental 
functions.”33  As an effort to save money, the circular established policy and procedures 
federal agencies must follow in determining whether existing federal government 
commercial activities should be outsourced.  As stated earlier, civilian involvement is 
nothing new to DoD; however, the degree and type of involvement is expanding rapidly. 
There are also other frequently overlooked factors in government competitive 
sourcing and they include “negative effects on the direct cost and quality of services; 
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33 Paul Light, Director, Center For Public Service, Brookings Institution Summary Of June 11, 2001 
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social costs on workers who receive lower wages and benefits; indirect costs, such as 
conversion costs and litigation costs; and, most importantly, the mixing of private with 
public interests.”34  The irony of competitive sourcing is that while more jobs are sourced 
out and government personnel are downsized, the requirement for oversight and 
management of these outsourced functions, inherently a governmental function, requires 
labor.   
Still, an increase in the process of competitive sourcing to private company tasks 
that used to be inherently governmental exists.  The functions sourced out range from 
routine jobs, such as cooking and cleaning, to specialized ones, such as maintaining and 
repairing sophisticated weapons systems, translating and transcribing and interrogating 
Iraq prisoners.  Michael P. Peters, a career Army officer and the executive vice president 
of the Council on Foreign Relations, states that the United States would be unable to 
sustain its military operation in Iraq, or anywhere else in the world, without the use of 
private contractors.  Peters also goes on to say “there aren’t enough soldiers in today’s 
smaller services to perform all the jobs required to maintain the armed forces; the number 
of active-duty military personnel dropped to 1.4 million in 2002 from just over 3 million 
in 1970, according to the Department of Defense.  This includes personnel to conduct 
oversight on contracts.  Moreover, in order to make service more attractive, the military 
had to eliminate a lot of the less-glamorous aspects of soldiering, such as cooking and 
cleaning duties.”35   
Although the Government has no profit motive, it does have the responsibility to 
optimize the use of scarce taxpayer resources.  Federal employees possess enormous 
knowledge, expertise, and loyalty that are not available from the private sector.  While 
the hiring of civilian contractors to support military operations may provide an avenue to 
optimize the use of scarce taxpayer dollars, the above research points out that oversight 
                                                 
34 Gary Storrs, Labor Economist, American Federation Of State, County & Municipal Employees 
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challenges stemming from a lack of personnel to monitor these civilians may be creating 
an environment ripe for fraud, waste and abuse. 
 
Administrative Challenges 
The administrative issues that may affect oversight stem from who controls the 
contractor, and the government’s ability to handle the administrative burden interposed 
by the increasing use of contractors on the battlefield.  In accordance with Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 1.602, the procuring contracting officer (PCO) and 
the administrative contracting officer (ACO) are the only ones with the authority to direct 
the performance of the contractor.  The contractor is only obligated to perform based on 
the terms and conditions of a contract unless otherwise directed by the ACO and/or PCO.  
ACOs and PCOs have the authority to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts and 
make related determinations and findings, and may bind the Government to the extent of 
the authority delegated to them.36  These contracting officers are responsible for ensuring 
performance of all necessary actions for effective contracting, ensuring compliance with 
the terms of the contract, and safeguarding the interests of the United States in its 
contractual relationships.  In order to perform these responsibilities, contracting officers 
are allowed wide latitude to exercise business judgment.37  
However, in a time of war, management and administration of the contractors 
becomes an issue in itself.  Commanders are responsible for the personnel in their 
respective area of responsibility (AOR), which includes contractors.  In order to direct the 
contractor to perform, the commander has to go through the PCO or ACO, who has the 
authority to direct the contractor.  This adds an additional level in the chain of command 
and challenges the efficiency of operations in support of the war mission.  The 
implementation of immediately needed changes is threatened to the point where if the 
change is not made in a timely manner, a loss of lives could be suffered.  This is why in a 
time of war, contractor personnel are “expected to adhere to all guidance and to obey all 




instructions and general orders issued by a Combatant Commander or Combatant 
Commander’s Representative.”38   
The key is to avoid or prevent the contract employees from appearing to be 
performing as a Government employee.  Performing in such a manner may be considered 
a personal service contract, which is prohibited under FAR Part 36.  The express terms 
and administration of the contract shall not be presented in such a manner as to which the 
contract takes on terms and conditions similar to a personal services.  Therefore, 
administration of the contracts becomes a very challenging issue. 
As stated earlier, studies suggest that there has been a significant increase in the 
number of contractors on the battlefield.  With this increase, an increase in the 
requirement or need for personnel to administer and manage the contracts arises.  
Although the primary duty of managing the contractors resides with the contracting 
officer, some responsibilities can be delegated to appointed representatives such as 
administrative contracting officers (ACOs) and Contracting Officer’s Technical 
Representative(s) (COTR).  Of course, the number of contracts and the complexity or 
scope of work included in the contract dictates the number of administrators or COTRs 
required for effective administration and management.   
As the requirement of contractors on the battlefield increases, the number of 
ACOS and COTRs required to manage the contractors’ performance increases.  This 
point is best stated in an article by Wendell C. Lawther, Contracting for the 21st Century: 
a Partnership Model, and Pricewaterhouse Coopers Endowment for the Business of 
Government, Jan 2002, page 11.  The article quotes David Walker, United States 
Comptroller General as follows, “…if you are going to contract out something, you’ve 
got to maintain an adequate number of public employees to manage cost, quality, and 
performance.”  To effectively manage these contractors the oversight process must be 
able to keep track of them and know what particular goods and services they provide.  As 
stated in the article entitled “Army Not Equipped to Manage Contractors on the 
Battlefield, written by Roxana Tiron, “Of particular concern is the inability to track and 
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oversee growing numbers of contractors.  Additionally, military commanders worry that 
they are not always aware of what contractors were hired to do and how they should be 
managed.”39  What happens when the work the contractor has been directed to perform is 
not written in the existing contract?   
When a contractor is directed to perform work that is unique to the Combatant 
Commander’s war situation, it could be considered outside of the scope of the contract or 
outside of the terms and conditions specified in the contract.  If additionally specified 
work is outside the scope of the contract and existing clauses, then a new contract must 
be executed.  However, the contracting process takes time and in a combat environment 
time is at a premium.  In order to mitigate future problems, to include tracking and 
knowing what the contractors are hired to do, the Army must hire contractors to 
administer and manage their contracts.  The Army recently awarded a $10 million 
contract, under which “we actually pay a contractor to come to account for contractors,” 
said Chambers in remarks to the National Defense Industrial Association’ armaments 
conference, in Parsippany, N.J.40  Based on the Army’s decision, the importance of 
effectively administering and managing these contracts has become a very important 
issue in regards to the cost versus the benefits of hiring contractors on the battlefield.   
As stated in the above paragraphs, as the number of contractors providing support 
on the battlefield continues to increase, the more prevalent administrative and 
management issues surrounding their presence likewise affects the oversight issue.  The 
DoD eventually must seriously address the issue concerning the real value gained from 
hiring contractors on the battlefield.  The rate in which the Government is sending 
contractors to the battlefield is so high that it is becoming very difficult to manage and 
provide oversight of contracts.  With the steady increase, the number of contractors on 
the battlefield may pass the optimum level of contractor support that is efficient and 
effective.  Mentioned previously, the Army has resorted to hiring contractors to manage 
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and provide oversight of the contractors in an effort to keep track of the contracts.  GAO 
is quoted in a CorpWatch article stating that “Given the billions of additional dollars the 
Army plans to spend on LOGCAP contract activities, the importance of the contract to 
the success of current military operations…we believe that high-level oversight and 
coordination are needed,’ GAO said.”41 
                                                 
41 CorpWatch homepage, US: Investigators Urge More Oversight of Halliburton, Retrieved on April 
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IV. MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF LOGCAP IN IRAQ 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The use of LOGCAP to support U.S. troops in Iraq is the largest effort in the 
history of LOGCAP.42  Although LOGCAP has proven to be effective in providing 
support to military missions throughout the years, the GAOhas identified inefficiencies in 
its management and oversight, and the source of guidance for managing and providing 
oversight also has issues.  Guidance has been identified as varying per military agency 
based on the type of contract, performance, and agency within DoD.  The LOGCAP 
contract in Iraq is a cost-plus-award-fee type that provides for the reimbursement of all-
allowable, allocable, and reasonable cost incurred in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of the contract.  
Cost-plus-award-fee type contracts provide financial incentives based on the 
contractor’s performance and the criteria stated in the contract.  The Government is able 
to evaluate the contractor’s performance in accordance with specified contract criteria. 
Therefore, an award-fee amount can be granted within the designated parameters 
specified in sections I and section H (Special Provisions) of the contract.  Thus, award 
fees can serve as a valuable tool to help control program risk and encourage excellence in 
contract performance.43  However, in evaluating performance, effective management and 
oversight are always paramount whether it includes an audit of the contractor’s 
purchasing system and/or surveillance of performance activities.  This can include but is 
not limited to cost and expenditures. 
Since 1997 the, GAO has reviewed, identified, and recommended management 
and oversight control measures for LOGCAP; however, there has been limited specific 
guidance established and implemented.  Initially, GAO reporting focused on the 
peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and at the same time provided information on the use of 
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LOGCAP in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti.  Since then, many reviews have been 
performed addressing lack of effective and efficient management and oversight of the 
LOGCAP contracts.  While improvements have been made in a number of areas, GAO 
reports have continued to identify management and oversight issues.  Two areas 
identified remain to be seen as adequate: 1) formal processes for obtaining economy and 
efficiency when using LOGCAP; and 2) a lack of coordination of contract activities 
between stakeholders.  Within this chapter, a general chronological summary of the GAO 
reports is provided leading up to specific issues and guidance established in Iraq.   
 
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AND 
OVERSIGHT:  GAO REPORTINGS  
1. Lack of Guidance and Tracking Mechanisms:  GAO/NSIAD-97-63 
As reported in GAO/NSIAD-97-63, Contingency Operations: Opportunities to 
Improve the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, program management and contract 
oversight had been the responsibility of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers since 1992.  
However, this responsibility transferred to the U.S. Army Material Command (AMC) 
October 1, 1996.44   
Although contractors on the battlefield were nothing new to DoD, at the time, 
there was little guidance in existence on managing LOGCAP.  The main deficiencies 
were that there was little guidance on how to manage contractor resources effectively, 
and how to integrate these contractors into military force structure units.  In the Bosnian 
mission, U.S. Army, Europe officials had limited or no experience with LOGCAP and 
lacked guidance on how to prepare planning documents and what type of management 
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and oversight structure to establish.45  As a result, the officials had to develop ad hoc 
procedures and systems to ensure they were effectively managing LOGCAP in Bosnia.46   
The GAO report also noted that U.S Army, Europe officials did not have the 
necessary information to track cost of operations, expenditure of LOGCAP funds, or 
monitoring of contractor performance because financial reporting and contract 
monitoring systems during the early phases of the mission were inefficient.  Commanders 
were not able to make informed decisions without these systems.  They could not 
conclude whether the contractor was adequately controlling costs, whether there were 
possibly more economical support alternatives, whether a valid requirement existed, or 
whether work was performed in accordance with contract terms and conditions.  
Although AMC officials worked with U.S. Army, Europe to improve program planning 
and management costs for future operations, similar issues continued to surface in other 
operations.  Thus, in September of 2000, the GAO issued another report on controlling 
cost in the Balkans.  
 
2. Authority, Roles, and Rotation:  GAO/NSIAD-00-225 
GAO report NSIAD-00-225, Contingency Operations: Army Should Do More to 
Control Contract Cost in the Balkans, continued to reveal issues pertaining to the lack of 
effective and efficient management and oversight.  Although the support contract utilized 
in the Balkans was not a LOGCAP contract, it provided the same types of logistical 
support service as the Bosnia LOGCAP contract.  As with the Bosnia LOGCAP contract, 
cost control was still a management issue and cost was not always considered in making 
decisions on new requirements.  GAO report NSIAD-00-225 states: 
In fact, some of the same problems we identified in our February 1997 
report on Army management of contractor support in Bosnia in 1996, such 
as that commanders were sometimes unaware of the cost ramifications of 
their decisions, emerged in Kosovo.  While we recognize the importance 
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of quickly deploying and properly caring for U.S. personnel in the 
Balkans, we believe that more considerations could be given to costs.47 
Again, GAO reports reveal issues concerning lack of effective management and 
oversight, and provide recommendations for future missions.  However, this time the 
GAO report further identified that there was a lack of understanding of the Balkans 
Support Contract, which hindered oversight.  The report identified three areas that limited 
effective oversight:  1) there was confusion over the Government’s authority under the 
contract; 2) personnel assigned to contract oversight roles in the theater had not been 
trained sufficiently; and 3) frequent personnel rotations of short duration precluded 
continuity of oversight efforts.48  Meanwhile, contractors continue to provide services to 
deployed forces and management and oversight inefficiencies continue to show up in 
GAO reports.  The lack of common guidance was identified as another contributing 
factor to inefficiencies and ineffectiveness. 
 
3. Varied Policies/Guidance:  GAO-03-695 
GAO report 03-695 reviewed Kosovo and the Persian Gulf, along with Bosnia.  
The report revealed that management and oversight issues were beginning to be 
addressed but there were still concerns about lack of standardized guidance.  For 
example, means of managing and overseeing contractors varied widely from component 
to component, and guidance to establish baseline policies to promote the efficient use of 
the contractors was not in existence.  GAO report 03-695 stated, “We found that general 
oversight of contractors appeared to be sufficient but that broader oversight issues 
existed.  These include inadequate training for staff responsible for overseeing 
contractors and limited awareness by many field commanders of all the contractor 
activities taking place in the area of operations.”49  Some contributing factors may have 
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been lack of guidance for essential contractor services and issues with contract language 
and oversight.   
Contractors were providing DoD with a wide variety of services.  They were now 
considered a part of the total force mix.  Field commanders’ awareness of contractors 
providing essential services during crises was critical to effective and efficient oversight.  
However, DoD did not include essential contractor services in its operational and 
strategic planning.  Furthermore, as early as 1988, DoD had noted this lack of central 
policy or oversight mechanism.50  Consequently, DoD Instruction 3020.37 was issued in 
1991 shortly before the Department of Defense Inspector General reported on the issues 
again.  The Inspector General’s report concluded that although DoD’s instruction 
provided the needed central policy that promotes the continuation of emergency essential 
services during crisis and hostile situations, the instruction needed revision to provide 
additional assurance such as the identification of war-stopper services and an annual 
reporting system identifying the numbers of emergency essential contracts and their 
personnel.51  DoD Instruction 3020.37 states: 
…assigns responsibilities and prescribes procedures to implement DOD 
policy to assure that components (1) develop and implement plans and 
procedures that are intended to provide reasonable assurance of the 
continuation of essential services during crisis situations and (2) prepare a 
contingency plan for obtaining the essential service from alternate sources 
where there is a reasonable doubt about the continuation of that service. 
Responsibility for ensuring that all contractor services are reviewed 
annually, to include new and existing contracts, to determine which 
services will be essential during crisis situations rests with the heads of 
DOD components.52 
Although DoD concurred with the Inspector General’s report, the services and 
agencies were given time to implement the instruction because the instruction had just 
been issued.  While DoD was allowing time for implementation of guidance for essential 
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contractor services such as LOGCAP, guidance, contract language, and oversight were 
other possible contributing factors that needed to be addressed.   
Guidance, contract language and oversight varied within DoD and the services.  
Guidance at the DoD, combatant-command, and service levels regarding the use of 
contractors to support deployed forces varied widely as did the mechanisms for managing 
the contractors - challenges were created that hindered the commander’s ability to 
oversee and manage the contractors efficiently.53  DoD had not provided central guidance 
for reference data on policy for oversight and management of the contractors in support 
of the deployed forces.  However, the Army was leading the way at the service level with 
the development of their guidance on managing effectively the contractors supporting the 
deployed forces.  The following examples were obtained form GAO report 03-069:  
Army Regulation 715-9—Contractors Accompanying the Force—
provides policies, procedures, and responsibilities for managing and using 
contracted U.S. citizens who are deployed to support Army requirements.  
Army Field Manual 3-100.21—Contractors on the Battlefield—addresses 
the use of contractors as an added resource for the commander to consider 
when planning support for an operation. Its purpose is to define the role of 
contractors, describe their relationships to the combatant commanders and 
the Army service component commanders, and explain their mission of 
augmenting operations and weapons systems support. It is also a guide for 
Army contracting personnel and contractors in implementing planning 
decisions and understanding how contractors will be managed and 
supported by the military forces they augment.   
Army Pamphlet 715-16—Contractor Deployment Guide34—informs 
contractor employees, contracting officers, and field commanders of the 
current policies and procedures that may affect the deployment of 
contractors. The guide focuses on the issues surrounding a U.S. citizen 
contractor employee who is deploying from the United States to a theater 
of operation overseas. 
These documents provided comprehensive and detailed direction to commanders, 
contracting personnel, and contractors on what their roles and responsibilities were and 
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how they should meet them.54  Nevertheless, the differences in the guidance at DoD and 
service level were sometimes contradictory and complicated implementation of the 
guidance. 
Although the Army was leading the way with their guidance on management and 
oversight of contractors in deployed locations, guidance remained varied throughout DoD 
and service levels.  This is viewed as adding further inefficiencies to the management and 
oversight process.  Guidance was identified as being contradictory and confusing to 
military commanders.  Even within the Army regulations, guidance regarding force 
protection of contractor personnel varied significantly.  Joint guidance stated that force 
protection was the responsibility of the contractor whereas Army guidance places the 
responsibility with the commander.  Furthermore, the Air Force used a hybrid of the two.  
This lack of uniformed guidance made it more complicated to oversee and manage the 
contractors.  To complicate the matter even more the contracts did not include language 
to ensure efficient oversight and management of the contractors or how to implement 
policy.   
At the time, contracts for support of deployed forces did not often include 
language that fostered efficient oversight and management.  There was no specific 
contract language related to the deployment and support of contractors.  So contracting 
officers tailored their particular contracts with language they deemed appropriate for their 
situation.  However, they may not have addressed all necessary oversight and 
management issues.  The lack of guidance limited visibility of the contractors.  A result, 
there was a lack of accountability of contractors arriving to deployed locations.  At the 
regional level, contractors had been arriving on the battlefield with no knowledge of the 
ground commander and without the support from the Government to perform in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract.  Moreover, ground commanders 
had little visibility over the totality of contractors that provided services at their 
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installations, which caused concerns regarding safety and security.55  This lack of 
guidance was seen as contributing to ineffective oversight and management. 
 
4.  Continued Planning/Oversight Issues:  GAO-04-869T 
After implementing lessons learned from prior contingencies and operations, 
planning and oversight was still among the four areas of concern in GAO reports.  GAO 
report 04-869T, Contract Management: Contracting for Iraq Reconstruction and for 
Global Logistics Support, revealed mixed results regarding the four areas reviewed: 
planning, oversight, efficiency, and personnel.  They found the use of the LOGCAP 
contract in Kuwait and Iraq was neither properly planned nor planned in accordance with 
the Army’s new guidance.  For instance, there was no comprehensive statement of work, 
there were issues in reaching agreement on terms, specifications and prices of services to 
be delivered, and there were problems in personnel – personnel shortages and proper 
contract management training.  Despite these shortcomings in oversight and contract 
management, contractors worked well with the military services to provide life and 
logistics support to more than 165,000 soldiers and civilians under some of the most 
difficult security circumstances in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Djibouti.56  
Consequently, customers reported that they were generally pleased with the services they 
received from contractors.   
Effective and efficient contract management and oversight is usually associated 
with proper prior planning and standardized guidance.  GAO report 04-869T found that 
while some customers adequately planned and adhered to established service guidance, 
this was not the case concerning the use of LOGCAP in Kuwait and Iraq.  The report 
stated that Army guidance was not followed and that the overall planning was inadequate.  
One example given was a documented statement from an official of the 101st Airborne 
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Division, stating that there was a lack of detailed planning for the use of LOGCAP at the 
theater and division levels for the sustainment phase of the operation.  Regarding 
planning and contract oversight, a closer working relationship with contractors and 
divisions would potentially be mutually beneficial to both the contactors as well as the 
customers. 
The primary responsibility for contract management and oversight lies with the 
contracting officer.   However, some oversight responsibilities may be delegated to the 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).  This did not work well in some 
instances.  For example, in situations where knowledge of field operations was needed, 
DCMA contract administrators usually appointed technical representatives to provide 
technical oversight of the contractor’s performance.  These technical representatives were 
typically customers who have been designated by their units, appointed, and trained by 
the administrative contracting officer.  The challenge with this arrangement was that 
there were major sites in Iraq (which used contract services extensively) that did not have 
an appointed representative.  There was no designated person to coordinate and track the 
activities of the contractor.  This was seen as contributing to problems with coordination 
and effective contract management and oversight.  
 
C. COORDINATION OF CONTRACT ACTIVITIES 
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines coordination as the 
“harmonious functioning of parts for most effective results.”  The lack of early 
coordination and planning for the use of LOGCAP contracts is often viewed as having a 
negative impact on the effectiveness of oversight and management.  Because of the lack 
of early coordination and planning, lines of authority were not established or clear, 
oversight processes were not established, requirements were not properly identified, 
award fee board information was not systematically collected, and separate chain of 
commands were active.  The following coordination and planning problems were 
identified in the DEFENSE LOGISTICS: High-Level DOD Coordination Is Needed to 
Further Improve the Management of the Army’s LOGCAP, GAO report 05-328: 
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• The Army Central Command—the Army command responsible for 
LOGCAP planning in Iraq and Kuwait—did not follow the planning 
process described in Army regulations and guidance as it prepared for 
operations in southwest Asia. While AMC was aware that the Army 
Central Command’s plan for the use of the contract was not 
comprehensive, it lacked the authority to direct better planning. 
• Effective oversight processes were not established by customers at 
several locations. A senior Army division-level logistician who returned 
from Iraq in late 2004 told us that there was nothing in the division’s 
operations orders that identified its responsibilities in managing or 
overseeing LOGCAP contract activities. Furthermore, the logistician had 
not seen the contract statement of work that described the division’s 
requirements nor had he seen the contractor’s technical execution plan that 
described how the contractor planned to meet the division’s requirements. 
He also said that the division had not prepared any formal assessment of 
the contractor’s performance that could be used at award fee boards. AMC 
has no authority to direct contract oversight by LOGCAP customers. 
• In our July 2004 report, we discussed a disagreement between the 
LOGCAP contractor and DCAA involving at least $88 million in food 
service charges to feed soldiers in Iraq. This occurred because the Army 
had defined a population for each base camp in the statement of work and 
had directed the contractor to feed that number. The actual number of 
soldiers served, however, was lower than the number specified in the 
contract for most locations. The contractor requested payment based on 
the base camp numbers in the contract but DCAA believes that the 
contractor should have been paid based on the actual number of meals 
served. These differing views created a billing disagreement.  According 
to the 101st Airborne Division official responsible for coordinating 
LOGCAP activities in the division’s sector in Iraq, the division was not 
aware of the cost implications of the disparity. He also said that the next 
higher headquarters for the 101st was not interested in the number of 
people who were using the dining facility, unless the number exceeded the 
number contracted for in the statement of work. 
• Information for award fee boards was not systematically collected from 
some customers, making it difficult to hold a board that could 
comprehensively evaluate the contractor’s performance. Award fee boards 
can serve as a valuable tool to control program risk and encourage 
contractors’ performance. AFSC recently told us that it had to convert 
some LOGCAP task orders to cost-plus-fixed-fee task orders partly 
because it lacked the information to hold an award fee board.  AMC is 
aware of these problems and has attempted to influence how the other 
DOD components carry out their roles by deploying personnel to assist the 
customer in using the LOGCAP contract effectively. However, while 
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AMC can ask the DOD components to carry out their responsibilities, it 
cannot direct their activities. This affects the extent to which it can control 
how effectively the contract is utilized. For example, in response to a 
series of questions we posed to AFSC regarding managing LOGCAP, an 
AFSC official provided the following examples where it has no ability, or 
limited ability, to influence contract activities: 
• Commanders on the ground ultimately make decisions regarding the 
composition of task orders and required services based on their operational 
needs. While AFSC provides input to the planning process, once the 
commander on the ground makes a decision, AFSC’s mission is to execute 
that action within established legal, regulatory, and contractual 
parameters. As an example, an AFSC official said that the command 
aggressively pursued the reduction of the major task order for services in 
Iraq (Task Order 59) with the customer. However, the customer’s decision 
was to maintain the task order in its current form with a planned increase 
in scope for the follow-on effort. Consequently, AFSC will execute the 
customer’s requirement. 
• AFSC’s procuring contracting officer has the primary responsibility for 
monitoring the contractor’s performance, and DCMA serves as the 
contracting officer’s agent in theater to monitor the performance of the 
contractor. However, DCMA makes an independent assessment regarding 
the level of staffing and resources allocated to perform its mission.  
AMC’s command relationship to the other DOD components is shown in 
figure 1. As shown, the DOD components with LOGCAP responsibilities 
have separate chains of command leading to the Secretary of Defense and 
only the Office of the Secretary of Defense is in a position to exercise 
overall coordination of the four components.57  
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Figure 2.   Organizational Structure for Management of the LOGCAP Contract in 
Iraq and Afghanistan    Source: From DOD.58 
 
 
Coordination of the contracts largely depends on the combined efforts of a 
number of separate DoD components to include AMC, the combatant commander, 
deployed units, DCMA, and Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).  AMC Pamphlet 
700-30, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (January 2002) designates AMC, DCMA 
and the customer as the responsible agents for monitoring contract performance.  The 
pamphlet also provides a fundamental understanding of LOGCAP.  It designates twenty-
two LOGCAP responsibilities.  Two or more components share the responsibilities; 
however, one component has the sole responsibility of six.  The one component is AMC.  
AMC has limited power but acts as the executive agent directing worldwide, regional, 
and country-specific planning, development, and execution of a LOGCAP contract.  
Consequently, AMC does not have command authority over the other components.  The 
limited power and lack of centralized control can be seen as a contributing factor to the 
overall coordination and oversight ineffectiveness across the DoD components.  
                                                 
58GAO, Defense Logistics: High-Level DOD Coordination Is Needed to Further Improve the 
Management of the Army’s LOGCAP, GAO-05-328 (Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2005). 
Office of the 
Secretary of Defense 
Department 
















However, there are also other means of providing oversight and management.  How 
effective the mechanisms are can be debated.  
 
D. CONTRACTOR PURCHASING SYSTEM REVIEW (CPSR) AS A MEANS 
OF OVERSIGHT 
A CPSR determines the adequacy of a contractor’s purchasing system and with a 
favorable systems review, a contractor’s purchasing system receives less oversight on 
expenditures of Government funds during the course of contract performance.  Upon 
review, many processes are examined such as: make or buy decisions; the selection of 
vendors; quoted prices and negotiation; placing and administering of orders; and 
expediting materials.  Could the review provide a false sense of security in the 
contractor’s purchasing system, thereby increasing the risk of excessive costs?   
Under normal conditions, the oversight of material cost and subcontractor cost 
passed on to the Government is decreased upon determination of an approved purchasing 
system.  Therefore, the risk of cost overruns and administration is also decreased.  Under 
other than normal conditions, such as war, a CPSR can increase risk of performance 
because of unknown factors that can influence the accuracy of the review.   
Although deficiencies may be identified during the stateside reviews of the 
contractor’s purchasing procedures, Iraq provides a more challenging market 
environment and condition that demands a different form of oversight over the 
contractor’s processes.  Normal competition and billing processes may not be possible in 
a wartime situation, and cost that normally would be termed as unreasonable may be 
considered reasonable depending on the urgency of need and possible lives impacted.  
Thus, the results of a CPSR conducted in a stable stateside environment under normal 
conditions may not accurately depict the effectiveness and the efficiency of a contractor’s 
purchasing systems in an unstable wartime environment. 
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1. Examination of Contractor’s Purchasing System 
The contractor’s purchasing system is the process and procedures by which a 
contractor obtains subcontracts and purchases other materials.  The objective of the 
CPSR is to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the contractor’s purchasing 
system as it relates to the expenditure of Government funds and compliance with 
Government policies, thereby mitigating possible risk.59   
The Government may place itself at risk when prime contracts are awarded non-
competitively or when the contract with the Government allows the contractor to pass all 
subcontractor costs on to the Government.60  Regulatory requirements for competition 
are relaxed during wartime and contingency situations; therefore, the probability of 
awarding non-competitive contracts increases based on the situation and environment.  
Although CPSRs are performed for each DoD and NASA contract with an estimated 
negotiated sales amount expected to exceed annual expenditures in excess of $25 million, 
the CPRS does not provide a means to mitigate the risk and the Consent to Subcontract 
clause provides little reliability as well.61  
 
2. Consent to Subcontract 
If the contractor does not have an approved purchasing system, the Consent to 
Subcontract clause is incorporated in the contract.  This clause requires the contractor to 
obtain approval from the Government prior to subcontracting.  An approved purchasing 
system decreases the number of subcontracts required to be approved by the Government. 
This approval is based on the adequacy of the purchasing system as determined by the 
Contractor Purchasing System Review. 
                                                 





3. Contractor Purchasing System Review Considerations   
CPSR also examines volume, complexity, dollar value of the contractor’s 
purchasing system, subcontracting activity, and past performance.  The results of the 
review are used to determine the adequacy of a contractor’s purchasing system.  With a 
favorable systems review, a contractor’s purchasing system receives less oversight on 
expenditures of Government funds during the course of contract performance.  This is a 
major contributing factor in the mitigation of cost risks.   
Could the review provide a false sense of security in the contractor’s purchasing 
system?  The below paragraphs examine the CPSR as an administrative oversight tool for 
the LOGCAP contract in Iraq.   Under normal conditions, the oversight of material cost 
and subcontractor cost passed on to the Government is decreased upon determination of 
an approved purchasing system.  Therefore, the risk of cost overruns and administration 
is also decreased.  Under other than normal conditions, such as war, a CPSR can increase 
risk of performance because of unknown factors, which can influence the accuracy of the 
review. 
 
4. Use of CPSR in Iraq 
The Army’s LOGCAP was established to manage the use of various civilian 
contractors to perform services in support of Defense missions during times of war and 
other mobilizations.62  Although the concept of LOGCAP is nothing new to DoD, 
oversight of LOGCAP contracts in Iraq has become an increasing concern of the public 
and the Government.  The root cause of these concerns have been identified in GAO 
reports as stemming from inadequate cost estimating, deficient accounting and 
inadequate documentation practices.  Of particular concern is current prime contractor, 
Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR). 
KBR, the prime contractor for LOGCAP in Iraq during the fall of Baghdad, was 
also a subsidiary of the Halliburton Company.  Defense auditors have criticized KBR for 
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inadequate cost estimating as well as weak (or ineffective) accounting and documentation 
practices.  As of September 2004, K.B.R. had received $8.6 billion under the LOGCAP 
contract as part of the military's effort to reduce its personnel and costs by outsourcing 
noncombatant jobs such as providing logistic and engineering services, food preparation, 
laundry, housing, and construction in support of military operations.63   However, a 
number of outstanding issues concerning KBR, particularly food services have been 
noted.64   
The logistical and engineering service needs of the military in Iraq are extensive, 
change constantly, and are real time driven.  In a war or contingency environment, timely 
response is a critical factor to effectively meet these needs.  Lives depend on these 
services.  Consequently, these needs promulgate the use of cost-type contracts.  
Typically, when there is reliable estimation of cost, firm or fixed price contracts are used.  
However, when urgency and uncertainty does not afford this type of estimation, the cost-
type contract is considered more appropriate.  
 
a. CPSR Effectiveness in Iraq   
 The LOGCAP contract is a cost-plus award fee basis and provides that the 
contractor be reimbursed for reasonable, allowable, and allocable costs incurred as 
prescribed in the contract.65  This type of contract provides for incentives that are based 
on performance.  However, as stated earlier, timely response and reaction to constantly 
changing requirements is the key to performance in a wartime or contingency 
environment.  With the LOGCAP contractor having to respond swiftly to unstable 
requirements in an unstable market environment, the CPSR is an ineffective tool to 
mitigate the cost risk. 
 Under normal conditions, contracting for goods and services with the DoD 
is very challenging and constrained by rules, regulations and laws.  Despite the relaxation 
                                                 




and waiver of purchasing rules, laws, and regulations during wartime, humanitarian, and 
contingency operations, challenges in acquiring goods and services are prevalent.  Hence, 
the result of a CPSR performed stateside is not always applicable to the market 
environment present during wartime, particularly in Iraq.  Therefore, the result is not 
always a good indicator of the level of risk associated with contractor’s and 
subcontractor’s costs which are usually past on to the Government. 
 
b. Stateside CPSR Audit Results 
 On May 3, 2004 Defense Contract Audit Agency Audit Report no. 3311-
2002, K11010001 was released.  Although the audit only covered the billing processes in 
Houston, Texas, it revealed that KBR was not being authorized for direct billing.  The 
report disclosed several deficiencies in KBR’s billing system.  The deficiencies included 
billings to the Government that were not prepared in accordance with applicable laws, 
regulations and contract terms.  System deficiencies resulted in material invoicing 
misstatements that were not prevented, detected and/or corrected in a timely manner.  
Notwithstanding the identification of these deficiencies, the Government still awarded 
KBR several large dollar value contracts in Iraq and Kuwait that increased the risk of 
possible cost impacts to the Government.  In the auditor’s opinion, the contractor’s 
billing system was rated inadequate in part.  So, why award large dollar contracts to a 
contractor with known deficiencies in their purchasing and cost systems? 
 Although these deficiencies were identified during the stateside inspection 
of the contractor’s purchasing procedures, the environment in Iraq and Kuwait provides a 
more challenging market environment and condition that demands a different form of 
oversight over the contractor’s processes.  Normal competition and billing processes may 
not be possible in a wartime situation, and costs that normally might be termed as 
unreasonable may be considered reasonable depending on the urgency of need and 
possible lives impacted.  The logistical support requirements in Iraq provide a contracting 
environment that is rather abnormal.  Thus, the results of a CPSR conducted in a stable 
stateside environment under normal conditions may not accurately depict the 
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effectiveness and the efficiency of a contractor’s purchasing systems in a wartime 
environment. 
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This final chapter addresses three areas.  First, primary research questions are 
addressed through real-time responses from survey participant(s).  The responses are 
compared to management and oversight issues covered in past GAO reports.  Secondly, 
recommendations submitted as to what should be focused on in future research projects 
that address management and oversight issues.  Lastly, an outline of the conclusions 
drawn from the research are provided. 
  
B. SURVEY RESPONSES COMPARED WITH GAO REPORTS 
 
1. What was the Policy and Objective Regarding Oversight of Contractors 
on the Battlefield? 
 
As stated earlier in Chapter IV, GAO report 03-695 found that general oversight 
of contractors appeared to be sufficient but broader oversight issues existed.  The broader 
issues included inadequate training for staff responsible for overseeing contractors and 
limited awareness by many field commanders of all the contractor activities taking place 
in the area of operations.66 
Based on our current interview with COL McQuinn during his tenure in Iraq 
between Jan-July 2005, he stated, “there didn’t seem to be a policy.  No one on the 
ground seemed to be able to get their arms around the hundreds of contractors operating 
outside of LOGCAP.  These contractors moved in and out of Iraq on a daily basis and 
supported multiple DoD and Department of State organizations.  DCMA, my 
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organization, was responsible for KBR, the LOGCAP contractor, and maintained 
accountability and oversight of all KBR personnel through daily SITREPS from KBR.”67 
 
2. What were the Planned Processes for Contractor Oversight/Contractor 
Usage? 
 
GAO/NSIAD-97-63, Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, stated that program management and contract 
oversight had been the responsibility of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers since 1992.  
However, this responsibility transferred to the U.S. Army Material Command (AMC) 
October 1, 1996.68 
The normal process of contract oversight and contractor management is the 
responsibility of the contracting officer who may delegate some of the responsibility to 
DCMA or a COTR.  According to GAO report 05-328, a draft regulation is in the works 
that proposes significant changes in three areas.  
The most significant policy change in terms of contract management and 
oversight is the recommendation that the supported unit (that is, the 
customer) be responsible for providing day-to-day control of contractors’ 
activities. Contract managers will continue to be responsible for the 
business aspects of managing the contractor workforce. The other two 
changes deal with (1) the accountability and support of contractor 
employees and (2) the medical screening, training, and equipping of 
contractor employees prior to deployment.69 
Based on GAO report 04-854, contract oversight processes were generally good 
but not always properly planned and there was room for improvement. 
While oversight of a contract is the contracting officer’s responsibility, the 
contracting officer may delegate some oversight responsibilities to 
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DCMA.  The contracting officers for LOGCAP, AFCAP, and BSC have 
all delegated significant portions of contract oversight to DCMA, while 
the Navy retains all contract administration and oversight responsibilities 
for the CONCAP contract. While DCMA’s contract oversight generally 
resulted in cost savings, opportunities exist to improve oversight.70 
   Based on an interview with COL McQuinn,  
Contractor oversight for LOGCAP was provided by DCMA.  The U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) also provided oversight for 
construction projects.  I can’t speak to oversight of contract work outside 
of LOGCAP and USACE.  Regarding contractor usage, the use of 
contractors was a necessity when it came to life support and LOGCAP 
also provided approx. 35-40 percent of the Combat Service Support.  
Multi-national Force Iraq (MNFI) and Department of State both had 
structured processes for identifying requirements and determining the 
appropriate source for the related support to include expedited review and 
approval processes for emergencies.71 
 
3. Were there Deviations from the Plan, Policy?  
 
Guidance at the DoD, combatant-command, and service levels regarding the use 
of contractors to support deployed forces varied widely as did the mechanisms for 
managing the contractors.  This lack of standardization was a challenge that hindered the 
commander’s ability to oversee and manage the contractors efficiently.72  DoD had not 
provided central guidance that baselined policy for oversight and management of the 
contractors in support of the deployed forces.  However, the Army was leading the way at 
the service level with the development of their guidance on managing effectively the 
contractors supporting the deployed forces. 
Based on our interview with COL McQuinn, deviations to guidance happened 
occasionally.  “Occasionally a customer would go directly to the LOGCAP contractor to 
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get work done, but as the force became more familiar with the approved requirements 
process these instances became rare.”73   
 
4. Is there a Lack of Oversight with LOGCAP? 
 
GAO reports 04-854 states that DCMA’s contract oversight generally resulted in 
cost savings; however, opportunities exist to improve oversight.  As stated earlier, 
oversight of contracts ultimately rests with the contracting officer.  In deployed locations, 
this may not be the case.  Most of the time, the contracting officers are not located in the 
deployed locations.  As a result, personnel from DCMA, an independent combat support 
agency within DoD oversee the contractor’s performance.  DCMA then ensures that the 
contract terms and conditions in terms of delivery, cost, and schedule, and performance 
requirements are met. 
In COL McQuinn’s opinion, “no; DCMA, with support from USACE was able to 
provide full oversight of all medium and high risk projects.  Our surveillance plans were 
based on the contract Statement of Work (SOW) and our Letter of Delegation from the 
Army Field Support Command.  We approached all surveillance based on risk.”74 
We asked COL Jake Hansen, currently deployed DCMA representative in Iraq, 
the same question and he responded as follows: 
 Well, that depends. Do parents have a lack of oversight with their 
teenagers?  What is enough? If you ask someone from GAO or AAA, they 
will tell you there is not enough oversight. I believe I have a prudent 
number of people in country right now given the security considerations 
we are working under.75 
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COL Hansen went on to say that given the security concerns, he believed the 
number of people he had was appropriate and that it lessoned the risk of serious injury or 
death.  “The more people I have in country, the greater the risk of serious injury or 
death.”76  
 
5. Is there a Problem with Tracking the Number of Contractors on the 
Battlefield? 
 
COL McQuinn’s comment:  See Question #1. 
 
6. Does the Military have Enough People, Whether Military Members or 
Civilian Employees, to Conduct Oversight? 
 
In the article entitled “Contractors were poorly monitored, GAO says”, Witte 
Griff identifies a few challenges that have arisen with the DoD’s increasing dependency 
on contractors on the battlefield.  More specifically, does the Army have the personnel to 
effectively manage these contractors?  Based on the article, the answer is no.  The Army 
awarded contracts to civilians to keep track and monitor their contracts. 
Based on COL McQuinn’s response, they had enough personnel to conduct 
oversight. “Yes.  We used a combination of DCMA personnel and appointed CORs 
(members of the force) to conduct oversight.”77  As COL Hansen stated in question two 
above, given the security considerations, he felt he had the proper number of people 
working in country.  He had a presence of sixty-eight individuals at sixteen locations 
throughout Iraq.78  However, “DoD reduced its acquisition workforce from 460,516 to 
                                                 
76 COL Jake B. Hansen, USA, Commander, Defense Contracting Management Agency, Deployed 
Iraq, Centcom. Personal Interview conducted by email on December 1, 2005. 
77 GAO, Military Operations: DOD’s Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts Requires 
Strengthened Oversight, GAO-04-854 (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2004). 
78 COL Jake B. Hansen, USA, Commander, Defense Contracting Management Agency, Deployed 
Iraq, Centcom. Personal Interview conducted by email on December 1, 2005. 
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230, 556 personnel, about 50 percent, from… [Fiscal Year] 1990 to…1999; however, the 
workload has not been reduced proportionately. …”79   
 
7. How are contractors on the Battlefield (LOGCAP) Addressed in the War 
Plans? 
 
In 2003, Michael Anderson and Gary Flaherty addressed a similar issue in there 
research entitled Analysis of the Contingency Contracting Support Plan within the Joint 
Planning Process framework.  Their research concluded the following: 
There is a lack of contracting details in the OIF Logistics Annex.  The 
contingency contracting actions taken during OIF suggest a lack of 
thorough planning and integration of the CCSP with the Logistics Annex 
of the OPLAN.  The omission of a detailed CCSP within the LOGPLAN 
creates weaknesses that can be avoided if involvement of a CCO within 
the Joint planning cells are conducted.  This includes transportation of 
supplies, Combat Service Support (CSS) organizations deployed to the 
theatre too late, and shortages of Class II, III, and IX items.80 
   
At the time of their research, they concluded that contractors were not sufficiently 
addressed in the Contingency Contracting Support Plans (CCSP).  The authors went on to 
state that “an area that can be strengthened involving LOGCAP support contracts is 
whether they are successfully integrated in support of the OPLAN and whether enough 
attention and accountability is provided during actual contract execution.”81 
Since then, and based on our research interview with COL McQuinn, strides have 
been made to integrate LOGCAP into operational planning.  COL Quinn’s comments 
                                                 
79 Yukins, Christopher R. “Empty Promise For the Acquisition Workforce”, The Government 
Contractor, Vol. 47, No. 18 May 4, 2005. 
80 Anderson, M. S., Flaherty, G. P., (2003). Analysis of the Contingency Contracting Support Plan 
within the Joint Planning Process framework, pp 38-39. Retrieved from NPS Library, BOSUN, 5 Dec 05. 
81 Anderson, M. S., Flaherty, G. P., (2003). Analysis of the Contingency Contracting Support Plan 
within the Joint Planning Process framework, p 36. Retrieved from NPS Library, BOSUN, 5 Dec 05. 
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regarding this matter are as follow, “I didn’t have any insight into war plans, but the 
LOGCAP contractor was integrated into operational planning.”82 
 
8. What are the Experience Levels of the Administrative Contracting 
Officers (ACO) in the Area of Performance and How Often do they 
Rotate from the War Zone?  
 
Based on the interview response from COL McQuinn, deployment rotation 
provided a challenge and does cause some continuity issues, but all of the civilian CCAS 
members are volunteers and they had no provisions for establishing permanent (1yr) 
positions for either civilians or military within DCMA.83    
COL McQuinn also added, “The DCMA ACOs were very experienced.  All are 
DAWIA Level II or III certified and warranted ACOs, and many have multiple 
contingency deployments.”84   
In addition, COL Hansen stated that almost all of his ACO’s have deployed with 
Level II certification.85  He had the below comments which include the impact of 
personnel rotation. 
Everyone in DCMA Iraq (except me) is here on a six month rotation. 
While it would be ideal to have the people here for longer rotations, it is 
not realistic. About 25% of my workforce are civilian volunteers. The 
other 75% are from all military services that belong to DCMA CMOs 
worldwide. They are on loan to me for the six-month period and then they 
go home to their home CMOs. Almost all my ACOs come here at least 
level two DAWIA certified and most are warranted.86   
                                                 
82 COL Paul M. McQuinn, USA, Commander, Defense Contracting Management Agency Dallas 
Personal Interview conducted by email on November 11, 2005. 
83Ibid. 
84 COL Jake B. Hansen, USA, Commander, Defense Contracting Management Agency, Deployed 
Iraq, Centcom. Personal Interview conducted by email on December 1, 2005. 
85 COL Paul M. McQuinn, USA, Commander, Defense Contracting Management Agency Dallas 
Personal Interview conducted by email on November 11, 2005. 
86 COL Jake B. Hansen, USA, Commander, Defense Contracting Management Agency, Deployed 
Iraq, Centcom. Personal Interview conducted by email on December 1, 2005. 
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9. Is the Field Manual for Using Contractors on the Battlefield and its 
Primary Regulation for Obtaining Contractor Support in Wartime Operations 
Available Now?  
 
As stated in Chapter IV, the 1997 GAO report cited an absence of guidance on 
effectively managing LOGCAP.  The report stated that improvements were needed.  Since 
then, the Army wrote two documents that provided guidance on using LOGCAP.  In January 
2003, the Army reissued Field Manual 3-100.21, Contractors on the Battlefield, and it is currently 
rewriting Army Regulation 715-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force.87  The documents were 
lauded to improve support forces’ understanding of the Army policies, responsibilities, and 
procedures for the best use of contractors on the battlefield. The manual provided guidance for 
planning, management, and the use of contractors at each level of operations.  It described the 
relationship between all the stakeholders such as between contractors and both the Combatant 
Commanders and the Army’s Service Component Commanders.  However, at the time of the 
GAO report 05-328 in March of 2005, the Army’s regulation for contractors accompanying the 
force was still in draft form.  An Army official working on the draft regulation said that once the 
regulation is finalized, the field manual will be revised to incorporate the changes.88   
 
Upon further research, COL McQuinn stated, “the manual and regulations are available 
now”, as of 11 November 2005.89 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the research outlined in the preceding chapters, GAO reports have 
consistently identified concerns regarding management and oversight of LOGCAP 
contracts.  The reports are not all inclusive; however, they do reveal that management and 
oversight is improving after working through the early years of poor planning and 
growing pains.  Therefore, our research concludes that better management, oversight is a 
                                                 
87GAO, Defense Logistics: High-Level DOD Coordination Is Needed to Further Improve the 
Management of the Army’s LOGCAP, GAO-05-328 (Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2005). 
88Ibid. 
89 COL Paul M. McQuinn, USA, Commander, Defense Contracting Management Agency Dallas 
Personal Interview conducted by email on November 11, 2005. 
 55
continuous work in progress, and plans of action have been incorporated to mitigate 
existing inefficiencies.  Policies and objectives covering the management and oversight 
of the LOGCAP contractors initially varied dramatically in DoD but a standardized 
manual has been established.  Although not fully implemented, it is currently with 
deployed units and is being utilized.  The following is a list of initiatives underway:   
Some of the initiatives the Army has completed or has under way that 
should contribute to stronger management of LOGCAP include (1) 
rewriting its guidance, including its field manual for the use of contractors 
on the battlefield, and its primary regulation for obtaining contractor 
support in wartime operations; (2) implementing near- and longer-term 
training for commanders and logisticians; (3) developing a deployable unit 
to provide training and assistance for commands using LOGCAP; (4) 
restructuring the LOGCAP contracting office to provide additional 
personnel resources in key areas; and (5) eliminating the backlog of 
contract task orders requiring definitization and conducting award fee 
boards in order to improve the financial oversight and control of 
LOGCAP.90 
Consequently, some inefficiency continues to show up in the GAO reports, which 
was also identified in our recent research survey questionnaire.    Those issues include a 
lack of a formal process for seeking economy and efficiency and coordination of contract 
activities.  
Based on GAO report 05-328 and our research, coordination of contract activities 
still needs attention.  The GAO reports and our research reveal a lack of coordination 
between the various components, which includes no customer involvement in monitoring 
the contractor’s performance.  We have sited in Chapter IV of this research numerous 
examples of problems with coordination. 
The other issue that continues to be of concern is the lack of a formal process for 
seeking economy and efficiency.  GAO recommended in 2004 that subject matter expert 
teams be created to travel to contract locations and evaluate contractor support.91  
                                                 
90GAO, Defense Logistics: High-Level DOD Coordination Is Needed to Further Improve the 
Management of the Army’s LOGCAP, GAO-05-328 (Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2005). 
91 GAO, Defense Logistics: High-Level DOD Coordination Is Needed to Further Improve the 
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Although DoD concurred, no action has been taken to remedy this problem as of the 
publishing date of GAO report 05-328, 21 March 05.  
 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Three recommendations are provided herein as a result of the research and 
comparison to GAO reports and interviews.  Because the recommendations that GAO 
provided in their report have not been implemented, our recommendations remain 
consistent with the GAO reports.  GAO report 05-328 recommends the following: 
 
• Designate a LOGCAP coordinator with the authority to participate in 
deliberations and advocate for the most effective and efficient use of the 
LOGCAP contract. Areas where we believe this coordinator should 
provide oversight include (1) reviewing planning for the use of LOGCAP 
to ensure it is in accordance with Army doctrine and guidance; (2) 
evaluating the types and frequency of services to be provided; and (3) 
evaluating the extent to which the contract is being used economically and 
efficiently. 
• Direct the coordinator to advise the Secretary of unresolved differences 
among the DOD components on how best to use LOGCAP, and to report 
to the Secretary periodically regarding how effectively LOGCAP is being 
used.92 
 
However, our third recommendation is based on an interview response from COL 
Hansen.  COL Hansen made a suggestion that supports implementation of the guidance at 
the foundation or core of our personnel training.  He recommended that we begin at the 
school houses by teaching our people LOGCAP doctrine and integrating it into our 
peacetime planning.  His interview comment is as follows: 
We need to work really hard to get the doctrine of LOGCAP in our school 
houses. We have also not done well integrating LOGCAP into 
our peacetime planning processes either. We need to use the luxury of 
                                                 
92 GAO, Defense Logistics:: High-Level DOD Coordination Is Needed to Further Improve the 
Management of the Army’s LOGCAP, GAO-05-328 (Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2005). 
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peace time planning to really think about and exercise LOGCAP into our 
OPLANs.93 
Implementing these recommendations is not an overnight process but involves a 
change of culture in the way the military views contractors on the battlefield.  Obtaining 
the most efficient and effective oversight involves collaborating with the contractors 
early on in the planning stages of war and deployments.  In order for contractors to better 
support the military, they need to be involved and included in all stages of the process.  
Again, this is best supported by COL Hansen’s e-mail interview comments.  They are as 
follow: 
Are they [KBR] an "arms length" contractor or a true partner on the team? 
Culturally, the military is not comfortable calling them a true partner. We 
still have "Government only" meetings. The truth is that we need to 
integrate KBR in absolutely everything we do here. How can they 
properly support us if we don't include them in everything we do? They 
need to be completely integrated in our planning and thought processes. 
That is very hard for the military to do! It is counter to everything we were 
taught about military relations with contractors. The difference is that 
LOGCAP has taken over functions that used to be done by the military. 
We must integrate them into our fold.94 
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